ABSTRACT. We propose a new quantum ontology, in which properties are the fundamental building blocks . In this property ontology physical systems are defined as bundles of type-properties (specified by algebras of observables in a Hilbert space) . Not all elements of such bundles are associated with definite case-properties, and this accommodates the Kochen-Specker theorem and contextuality . Moreover, we do not attribute an identity to the type-properties, which gives rise to a novel form of the bundle theory . There are no "particles" in the sense of classical individuals in this ontology, although the behavior of such individuals is mimicked in some circumstances . This picture leads in a natural way to the symmetrization postulates for systems of many "identical particles ."
Introduction
Although talk of particles is part and parcel of everyday practice in quantum physics, it is generally recognized that it is less than clear what quantum particles are: quantum mechanics makes it difficult to think of them as independent and localized entities, in the way of classical physics . Typical non-classical features that are responsible for this problematic status of particles in quantum theory are contextuality, indistinguishability and non-separability . These are recognized novel characteristics of quantum theory, but most of the philosophy of physics literature treats them as more or less independent of each other and no unifying ontological picture has been proposed in which they all find a natural place . The present paper is part of a project that aims at filling this lacuna: we propose to develop a new quantum ontology in terms of which a general characterization of quantum systems can be given .
The perspective that guides our work is that properties constitute the fundamental ontological building blocks that form physical systems . As we will argue, in a quantum property ontology the notorious quantum peculiarities emerge as natural aspects of physical systems . In this article we will focus on contextuality and indistinguishability and explain how these features naturally fit into our properties perspective, and why this has the consequence that the concept of a "particle," with its classical connotations, cannot be taken as fundamental . We will also explain under what circumstances and with what limitations talk of particles can nevertheless be retained .
Quantum Systems as Bundles of Properties
What is an individual? The classical philosophical concept of an individual is inspired by the 'things' or 'objects' of everyday experience . An individual object is something that can be identified here and now, is different from other individuals, and continues to be what it is as time goes on .
A classical individual is an indivisible unity in the sense that it either cannot be divided at all or, if it can be divided, that the results of the division are different from the original . Moreover, an individual is subject to the Kantian category of quantity (unity-plurality): individuals are either one or many . In the latter case, they may form aggregates, in which they can be counted individually . These features distinguish the category of individual from the category of "stuff," which can be divided into portions without losing the stuff identity, and whose portions, when put together, cannot be individually counted (see Lewowicz and Lombardi 2013) . As Henry Laycock puts it, the key to the character of the general category of individual "evidently rests in the notions of unity and singularity -and thereby perhaps, more generally, in the concepts of number and countability ." (Laycock 2010, p . 8) .
Individuals can be given names and fall under definite descriptions . An individual possesses properties (possibly including relations as n-adic properties); linguistically this is captured by predicates applied to a subject . The ontology of objects possessing properties is basic to classical thinking and has generated the fundamental subject-predicate structure of language . This mirror relation between the ontological category of individual and the linguistic category of subject was highlighted by Peter Strawson in his classical book, Individuals, in which he states that an individual is " [a] nything whatever can be introduced into discussion by means of a singular, definitely identifying substantival expression" (1959, p . 137) , and
